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"What happens in Nuremberg, no matter how many objections it
may invite, is a feeble, ambiguous harbinger of a world order, the need
of which mankind is beginning to feel."' These words addressed by
Karl Jaspers to the German people shortly after the end of World War
II have peculiarly vivid relevance to the situation Americans now
must deal with in relation to the momentous issues of war crimes and
individual responsibility presented by the continuing American in-
volvement in the Indochina War.
Whatever else, Telford Taylor's book, Nuremberg and Vietnam:
An American Tragedy, helped greatly to move the issue of war crimes
and individual responsibility toward the center of public conscious-
ness in this country. Professor Taylor's credentials of career and craft,
his balanced and lucid style of analysis, and his lawyer-like restraint
made his contention that America's involvement in Vietnam was, in
many respects, criminal in the Nuremberg sense much more difficult
to shrug off than some of the prominent earlier efforts, directed at mobil-
izing anti-war sentiment, to demonstrate the same conclusion.2 Also, Pro-
fessor Taylor's timing was superb. His book rode the crest of indignation,
confusion, and concern that was created by the sensationalism of the
disclosures of the My Lai massacre and the prosecution of some of the
leading participants. In addition, anti-war veterans were beginning
to speak out on their experiences in the combat theater that routinely
involved intentional killing and cruelty toward innocent Vietnamese
civilians. And, finally, Taylor's book came out at a time when pro-war
t Milbank Professor of International Law and Practices, Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs Princeton University. B.S. 1952. University of Pennsylva-
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1. K. JAsPERS, TE QUFSnON OF GmNar GUiLT 60 (1947).
2. See AGAINsT ThE CRIME OF SILENcE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WVAR CQMusEs
TRIUNAL (J. Duffett ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Durrrrr]; IN TiHE NAME OF AMEPICPA
(S. Melman ed. 1968). The first of these books is the published portion of the Proceedings
of the Bertrand Russell Tribunal held in two sessions during 1987, and the second is a
comprehensive compilation of newspaper extracts reporting on American battlelield con-
duct, sponsored by an interdenominational group of leading American clergymen. The
documentation, although one-sided, remains in my view largely accurate and is generally
consistent -with subsequent, more balanced assessments, such as Taylor's, of allegations of
criminal conduct by the United States. For a sympathetic and incisive consideration of
Taylor's book, see Boudin, Book Comment, 84 Ha. L. REv. 1940 (1971).
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sentiment had virtually vanished from the scene and the political
debate was confined to disagreement about exit strategies.8 The recital
of these factors is not, of course, meant to draw attention from Profes-
sor Taylor's central achievement in writing on this difficult and contro-
versial subject an illuminating book that conveys a great deal of
knowledge and wisdom in relatively few pages.
The war goes on, however, and the debate evolves. Professor Taylor
has been a vigorous participant in this debate and has since developed
his position in response to criticism and the pressure of events. 4 In
the late spring of 1971 a portion of the so-called Pentagon Papers was
placed in the public domain and managed to dissolve many carefully
cherished ambiguities about the motives, intentions, and objectives
of Washington's leading policy-makers with respect to America's
involvement in Indochina. When the full corpus of McNamara's task
force study of the history of United States involvement becomes avail-
able later this year,5 these materials will establish two propositions
having a direct and important bearing on Taylor's book:
1. There is clear proof that American civilian and military leaders
did not take into account the moral dimension of their decisions
to bring high-technology weaponry to bear in massive fashion on
a low-technology society.6
2. The case against the United States on the aggressive war issue
is much stronger than when Taylor was writing his book.7
3. There is, of course, confusion as to what constitutes an "exit" from Vietnam and
whether President Nixon's policies of phased withdrawal of American combat forces plus
"Vietnamization" is an "exit" at all. The irony implicit in a strategy of winning-while-
leaving is unabashedly proclaimed in the title of a book by the world's foremost counter-
insurgency specialist, Robert Thorn mpon. See R. THOMPSON, No ExIT FROM VIETNAM (1969),
4. I refer particularly to Professor Taylor's assertion that General Westmoreland
appeared subject to criminal prosecution if his relation to battlefield atrocities was
appraised by the standards of In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), and to his call for the
creation of a high-level citizens' commission of inquiry into issues of war crimes and Indi-
vidual responsibility. The former position was reported in N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1971, at 3,
col. 4, and the latter was taken during a symposium discussion at Columbia Law School,
March 20, 1971.
5. Beacon Press has announced its intention to publish in 1971 a complete set of
the "Pentagon Papers" as released by Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska. These documents,
when generally available, will provide law students and faculty with an exhaustive (al.
though nevertheless incomplete) data base for analysis of the principal legal Issues raised
by the American involvement. It would serve the national interest in my view If this
opportunity is fully used. A conference of law journal editors might be a constructive first
step in planning the kind of treatment that seems required. The Government Printing
Office has now also published a multi-volume version of the "Pentagon Papers" that 1s
claimed to be over ninety-five per cent complete.
6. See in this connection, the contributions of Gabriel Kolko and Jonathan Schell to
NVAR CRIMES AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENcE 47-68 (E. Knoll & J. McFadden eds, 1970)
[hereinafter cited as KNOLL & MCFADDEN). For fuller accounts see two books by Jonathan
Schell: TnE MILITARY HALF (1968) and THE VILLAGE OF BEN Suc (1967).
7. THE N.Y. TIMEs, THE PENTAGON PAPES (Gold, Segal & Abt eds. July 1971) [hereinafter
cited, as Tms PENTAGON PAPERS] contains many documents pertaining to the decislons
to intervene in Vietnamese. affairs after 1954, to bomb North Vietnam in 1965, and to
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Even before the release of the Pentagon Papers it was clear that the
issue of war crimes had developed on its own. The public outcry after
Lt. Calley's conviction (inducing presidential gestures of conciliation)
and the mere persistence of the war have driven the issue deeper into
"the hearts and minds" back here. Furthermore, the irony of putative
"war criminals" being rewarded with such jobs as the presidency of
the World Bank, the presidency of The Ford Foundation, the editor-
ship of Foreign Affairs, and high-salaried professorships at leading Amer-
ican institutions of learning has not been entirely lost on the widening
anti-war community in this country-nor, I might add, has the further
irony of treating those who have struggled to bring this war to an end
as "enemies of the people," as criminals, exiles, or traitors. The situ-
ation, then, is one of inflamed awareness, a sense that war crimes have
been committed on a large scale by American officialdom, a conscious-
ness that "the system" remains under the control of those who partic-
ipated or conspired with these "war criminals." As a result, a tension
is developing between the clarity of the facts and the law on the war
crimes issue and the inability to bring this clarity to bear on policy,
even to the extent of hastening the end of the war.
Under these circumstances the occasion calls for a reconsideration
of the approach taken after World War II toward individual criminal
responsibility for the war leaders of Germany and Japan. In essence,
we need to determine whether those war crimes trials should be viewed
as precedents in an evolving legal tradition of individual responsi-
bility or as special events associated with the conditions of victory in
World War II which have been by now, as a result of ensuing patterns
of statecraft, denied any status as legal precedents. Naturally, this
issue cannot be resolved in a decisive way, but the question raised
underlies the discussion of individual responsibility for American
leaders in connection with the Vietnam war and is of vital importance
in appraising Professor Taylor's book. In the remainder of this article,
then, I will consider the Nuremberg idea as it emerged, as it relates
to the present controversy, and as it might evolve in the future.
I. The Nuremberg Idea Reconsidered
It is not surprising that in the present situation people are skeptical
about the moral stature of international law in the Nuremberg area.
introduce large-scale American ground forces in 1965. Although a small sample of the
full corpus of the "Pentagon Papers," these materials seem ample to enable a court to
reach a well-reasoned- decision. -
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There is, indeed, a rebirth of cynical realism, often proclaimed under
the peculiar contention that it is excessive moralism-not immorality
or even amorality-that has been responsible for the most serious ex-
cesses of American battlefield practices in Vietnam.
The underpinning of this dismissal of a kind of ethnocentric moral-
ism and of its replacement by the revival of national interest thinking
has been well expressed in a recent article by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.:
"Until nations come to adopt the same international morality, there
can be no world law to regulate the behavior of states. Nor can inter-
national institutions-the League of Nations or the United Nations-
produce by sleight of hand a moral consensus where none exists.
World law must express world community; it cannot create it." On
this basis Schlesinger condemns the American war as "immoral" be-
cause the scale of the commitment
burst the limitations of national interest. Our original presence
in South Vietnam hardly seems immoral since we were there at
the request of the South Vietnam government. Nor does it seem
necessarily contrary to our national interest; conceivably it might
have been worth it to commit, say, 20,000 military advisers if this
could preserve an independent South Vietnam. But at some point
the number of troops, and the things they were instructed to do,
began to go beyond the requirements of national interest. This
point was almost certainly the decision taken in early 1965 to
send our bombers to North Vietnam and our combat units to
South Vietnam and thus Americanize the war.0
According to Schlesinger it was the moralism of the architects of escala-
tion that "intensified senseless terror till we stand today as a nation
8. schlesinger, The Necessary Amorality of Foreign Affairs, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Aug,
1971, at 73. A more extreme defense of the exclusion of moral factors from statecraft may
be found in M. COPELAND, THE GAmE OF NATIONS: THE AmoRALnry or Powut PO1LlIC
(1969), especially at 9-180. Of course this kind of approach has been evolved in the much
earlier characteristic works of such major analysts of foreign affairs as E.H. Carr, George
Kennan, and Hans Morgenthau. These analysts were, in turn, properly reacting (although
over-reacting in my view) to certain indulgences in moralism and legalism exhibited by
American statesmen and international lawyers; Woodrow Wilson and John Foster Dulles
epitomized the kind of moralistic-legalistic orientation that has clearly been as damaging
to American thought and action in world affairs as has been that attributable to the
cynical-realist critique of it. I have attempted to develop an intermediate position on these
issues as they bear upon international law. See R. FALK, TE STATUS OF LAW IN INTER-
NATIONAL SocIEry 41-59 (1970); Falk, Law, Lawyers, and the Conduct of American Foreign
Relations, 78 YALE L.J. 919 (1969).
9. Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 77. It is misleading to talk of "the request of the
South Vietnam government" in a situation in which prior American diplomatic and
covert interventions had done so much to constitute and sustain in power that governing
group. For trenchant observations on the limits of governmental discretion to authorize
the destruction of their people and country, see Farer, The Laws of War 25 Years after
Nuremberg, I-rr'L CONCILIATION, May 1971, at 29-34. Farer acidly concludes: "An Invita.
tion from the local butcher no longer suffices to legitimate a slaughter." Id. at 30.
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disgraced before the world and before our own posterity."' 0 In essence,
this approach associates the immorality of the war mainly with the
disproportion of the means adopted, given a reasonable construction
of the geopolitical ends in view, and argues that had the policy-makers
engaged in these sorts of calculations rather than in crusading or mis-
sionary claims relating to "freedom," "commitment," and "com-
munism," then the threshold of immorality would never have been
crossed. There is an apparent paradox here-immorality arises because
moral issues are emphasized as the roots of policy. For Schlesinger this
paradox is overcome by realizing that statist imperatives of rival
national governments prevent the formation of any moral consensus
in world society, and by finding that the invocation of moral con-
siderations as a justification for national policy is a self-serving moralism
that prevents the operation of the only kind of morality possible on
an international level-namely, the prudential calculation of means
and ends. Within such a framework, law follows morality, and the role
of law is confined to reinforcing the logic of the moral order. As such,
it would be appropriate to limit 'the role of law to questions of means,
not ends.
But what, then, of Nuremberg as a basic orienting tradition?
Clearly, the logic of Nuremberg rests on a moral order in which the
ends of policy are crucial and in which the assessment of means is based
on their intrinsic character as well as by links of proportionality to
ends. That is, the prime effort at Nuremberg was to regard "aggres-
sive war" both as illegal and as entailing individual criminal responsi-
bility for its principal planners. In the language of the Judgment:
"To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international
crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other
war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the
whole."' "1 Such a position rests on the view that it is the nature of
the war policies, not their proportional relationship to the national
interests at stake, that is the basis of moral and legal appraisal. In
Schlesinger's terms the whole effort by Japan to wage war to expand
its zone of economic and security control would appear to have been
a reasonable, if ultimately disastrous, calculation of means/ends in
the context of national interest. The Tokyo Tribunal found that aggres-
sion was committed by Japan because of its initiation of the war by
10. Scblesinger, supra note 8, at 77.
11. Quoted in L. SOHN, CA-SS AND OTHE MATE .ALs ON WoLD LAv 936 (1950).
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military attacks. x2 And certainly it is this view of the central teaching
of Nuremberg that underlies Taylor's view of the relevance of legal
criteria to war policies.x3 But oddly enough even Schlesinger argues
that "the Charter, Judgment, and Principles of the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal constitute, along with other treaties, rudiments of an interna.
tional consensus" that warrant enforcement:
Such documents outlaw actions that the world has placed beyond
the limits of permissible behavior. Within this restricted area a
code emerges that makes moral judgment in international affairs
possible up to a point. And within its scope this rudimentary code
deserves, and must have, the most unflinching and rigorous en-
forcement.14
Schlesinger seems confused about the content of Nuremberg, as
well as about the extent to which his endorsement of substantive rules
does not comport with his insistence on means/ends judgments rather
than intrinsic appraisals of foreign policy. He writes that these "interna-
tional rules deal with the limits rather than with the substance of
policy," and, as such, "do not offer grounds for moral judgment and
sanction on normal international transactions (including, it must be
sorrowfully said, war itself, so long as war does not constitute aggres-
12. On the Japanese case for initiating hostilities, see the long dissenting opinion of
Judge R.B. Pal of India in the Tokyo war crimes trials, reprinted In INTERNATIONAL
MiLrrARY TRmUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (1953) (Dissentient judgment of Justice R.B. Pal)
and R. MINEAR, VICTOR'S JusncE: TnE Toxyo WAR Cauitis TmiAL (1971). See also the
valuable discussion in N. CHOmSKY, AmERICAN POWER AND THE NEW MANDARINS 170.208
(1969).
13. At Nuremberg, three categories of offenses were regarded as "punishable as crimeg
under international law:"
a. Crimes against peace:
(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggtesslon or a
war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances;
(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of
any of the acts mentioned under (i).
b. War crimes:
Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not limited
to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave-labour or for any other purpose
of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder ,or ill-treatment of
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public
or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity.
c. Crimes against humanity:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts
done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or re-
ligious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on In
execution of or in connexion with any crime against peace or any war crime.
This is the formulation relied upon in the Nuremberg Charter and judgment and carried
forward in the "Nuremberg Principles" as set forth by the International Law Commission
in 1950. There is no reason to question its authoritativeness so far as reporting on what was
decided at Nuremberg, although the authoritativeness of Nuremberg itself is, of course,
a separate matter.
14. Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 73.
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sion and so long as the rules of warfare are faithfully observed):"'
But, of course, this is as much as the most morally and legally inclined
analyst would contend. Why, then, does Schlesinger write with such
indignation about "moral absolutism" as a "malady" that "may strike
at any point along the political spectrum"? Why does he state that
"[f]rom the standpoint of those who mistrust self-serving ethical
stances, the heirs of John Foster Dulles and the disciples of Noam
Chomsky are equal victims of the same malady. Both regard foreign
policy as a branch of ethics."'10 This strikes me as sheer nonsense in
light of Schlesinger's earlier comments on Nuremberg and wars of
aggression. Clearly, in the context of Indochina, Noam Chomsky (and
his disciples) have done nothing more than to document his con-
clusions about the aggressive character of the war and the barbarous
tactics by which it has been waged. How can Schlesinger possibly
explain his Vietnam position as merely one of the degree of violence
used to crush the National Liberation Front? One can, to be sure, con-
tend that carrying the war beyond a certain point was stupid ("counter-
productive" as the authors of the Pentagon Papers tend to put it), but
surely it did not become "aggression" at some point because of an
increase in its magnitude.'7
Something very fundamental is exhibited by Schlesinger's confusion.
Oddly enough, given Taylor's background and intellectual rigor, the
same confusion lies latent in his book. Richard Wasserstrom has
mounted a strong attack on Taylor, properly calling attention to the
opening of the final paragraph of the book which Taylor begins as
follows: "One may well echo the acrid French epigram and say that
all this 'is worse than a crime, it is a blunder'-the most costly and
tragic national blunder in American history."' 8 Wasserstrom goes on
(in my opinion unfairly) to say that "Taylor's point of view is defec-
tive, inadequate, and dangerous because unlike him (and the French,
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. It is true, of course, as I have argued elsewhere, that as certain thresholds of
escalation were crossed the issue of aggressive war became easier to analyze from a legal
point of view. The most important of these thresholds was the decision to carry the
air war to North Vietnam which was put into operation in February of 1965. As long as the
violence was confined to South Vietnam, and conflicting allegations of intervention were
being made, it was difficult to resolve the major issues of fact and law. See generally Falk,
International Law and the United States Role in the Vietnam War and Falk, International
Lawi and the United States Role in the Vietnam War: A Response to Professor Moore, in 1
TnE ViEmAm WAR AND INrrEaNAToNAL LAw 362-401, 445-503 (I. Falk ed. 1963), especially
at 375-81, 490-94.
18. T. TAYLOR, NURmBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMNaPcAN TRAGEDy 207 (1970) [herein-
after cited to page number only].
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apparently) I happen to believe that crimes are much worse than
blunders." 19 What Wasserstrom is on to is Taylor's effort to appear
realistic and tough-minded. The risk with so doing is to appear both
hopelessly confused and basely insensitive; it is one thing to reject the
Nuremberg tradition out of hand as dangerous humbug, but quite
another to affirm its relevance, as does Taylor, in such a way that
Pentagon and State Department hardhats in the Acheson-Kissinger
tradition won't slam the door in your face. Liberals in the Kennedy-
Johnson mold of Schlesinger (and probably Taylor) want it both
ways-to be in on the talk because they know what international con-
flict is all about and to remain somehow in touch with such minimal
traditions of human decency as are embodied in the Nuremberg
tradition.20
This kind of normative (moral/legal) ambivalence is, I think, a
characteristic of a period of transition within international life itself.
I have tried to depict both the normative tension and the transition
process in relation to the interplay between the statist imperatives of
the Westphalia tradition and the communitarian drift of the Charter
tradition.21 The Westphalia tradition is a shorthand description of the
system of world order that has prevailed in international life since
1648 when the Peace of Westphalia was concluded at the end of the
Thirty Years War. The main characteristic of this system is the
acknowledgment of the sovereignty of national governments in domes.
tic and international affairs. The Charter tradition, which is as yet
far weaker and of much more recent origin, can be understood as
19. N.Y. Raviaw OF BOOKS, August 12, 1971, at 30. See also the letter in support of
Taylor's treatment by Professor Jonathan Mirsky to which Wasserstrom is here addressing
himself. Id. For Wasserstrom's full critique of Taylor's approach, see Criminal Be.
havior, N.Y. RvEiw OF BOOKS, June 3, 1971, at 8-13.
20. Given the character of nuclear war and large.scale counter-insurgency war, it seems
increasingly difficult to argue on behalf of maintaining effective legal limits during a period
of warfare. The bases of the laws of war involve the capacity to maintain distinctions
between military and non-military targets with sufficient clarity to establish some coil-
sistent limits upon the concept of "military necessity." I am increasingly persuaded that It
is not possible to maintain such limits given the technology and doctrines of modern
warfare, and, therefore, feel that the law of war must virtually presuppose a pacifist oren.
tation if it is to serve any serious purpose in the future. For a very important argument
against this view, but in a somewhat earlier setting, see the influential article of Josef
Kunz, The Chaotic Status of the Laws of War and the Urgent Necessity for Their Re.
vision, 45 AMs. J. INT'L. L. 37 (1951). Taylor's endorsement of the laws of war is also rele,
vant. See pp. 39-41.
21. I have set forth this analysis in Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Con-
ceptions of the International Legal Order, in I THE FUTURE OF THE LEGAL ORDt 32-70
(C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1969). For a broader analysis along similar lines, see R. FAt.,
THIS ENDANGERxD PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR HUMAN SUItIVAL (1971). Whether
the Westphalia tradition is waning and the Charter tradition waxing is a difficult question,
since the emergent nationalism of the Afro-Asian world and the rise of cosmopolitanism and
militant subnationalism in Europe and North America must both be taken into account.
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seeking to qualify the discretion of sovereign governments in the area
of war and peace through the establishment of rules of restraint and
the creation of international institutions of review. One consequence
of the coexistence of these two approaches to the organization of inter-
national life is the exposure of a number of contradictions between
sovereign discretion at the national level and community judgment at
the global or regional level. The present structure of power and
authority in the world order system is weighted down on the West-
phalia side of the seesaw. Principal governments control military
capabilities and exercise effective discretion over their employment.
The political organs of the United Nations function mainly as instru-
ments of statist diplomacy rather than as world community actors of
the sort envisaged by much of the language of the United Nations
Charter.22 These considerations make it appear, on one level, naive
and misguided to invoke the Nuremberg tradition as a basis for
judging the dominant actors in world affairs. What is the point of
fulminations put forward in moral and legal language against the
powerful and mighty? The only realistic hope, given this outlook, is
to persuade them that it is contrary to their own welfare to wage wars
that do not promote the national interest. Hence the practical appeal
of Schlesinger's plea for amorality and a sober national interest calcu-
lus; hence, also, Taylor's tendency to allow his critique of the Vietnam
War to confuse its military failure as an exercise in intervention with
its normative status as an aggressive war involving criminal tactics. It
is revealing that Taylor acknowledges that he was "one who until
1965 supported American intervention in Vietnam as an aggression-
checking undertaking in the spirit of the United Nations Charter,"
and then, like Schlesinger, goes on to emphasize the drastic changes
in that year in "the nature, scale, and effect of intervention" as the
decisive elements in altering his attitude.2 3
Some of this ambivalence is embedded in the Nuremberg experience
itself. Only the victorious nations participated in setting up the Tribunal
and passing upon the charges.*24 More important, ghastly Allied actions
22. For a full statement of this proposition, see Falk, The United Nations: Various
Systems of Operation, in THE UNrrE NAToNSs IN I NaNATIONAL PoLMrtcs 184-20 (L.
Gordenker ed. 1971).
23. P. 206. It is important to realize that by 1965 more than a year had passed since
the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem, the Geneva Accords had been partially repudiated, an
overt United States role in a large-scale counter-insurgency mar had been revealed, the
Gulf of Tonkin incident had occurred, and the Resolution bearing that name had been
passed.
24. The Tribunal for the Far East convened at Tokyo, had wider representation than
did Nuremberg and generated dissenting and concurring opinions.
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in the war such as the destruction of Dresden, the fire-bombing of
Tokyo, and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were kept
outside the orbit of war crimes inquiry. Standards of negative reciproc-
ity were relied upon, namely, that the leaders of the defeated states
brought before the bar of international justice were not charged with
any actions-such as submarine attacks without prior warning or the
bombardment by air of enemy cities-that were also the common
practice of the victorious side. Such forbearance at Nuremberg can be
interpreted to mean that anything the victor does is beyond condemna-
tion as criminal and that the defendant might succeed with a tu quoque
argument. So interpreted, Nuremberg is deeply flawed if understood
as moral education. However, there is more to Nuremberg than its
Judgment. Certainly part of the experience was the creation of a prece-
dent contributing to an international learning experience on world
order that would, with the passage of time, broaden its significance
beyond the original circumstances of its application. Part of the ide-
ology of Nuremberg itself was contributed by Mr. Justice Robert
Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor for the United States at the Nurem-
berg Trials, in his celebrated assertion that "[ilf certain acts in
violation of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United
States does them or whether Germany does them, and we are not pre-
pared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we
would not be willing to have invoked against us."25 Certainly
Professor Taylor's book is a testimonial to the accuracy of Jackson's
prediction.26 The United States has not been defeated in Indochina
in anything like the way that Germany was defeated in World War 11.
The military mission has failed and has been widely discredited, but
the military and economic prowess of the country remains preeminent
in world affairs. Nuremberg has reached beyond itself when applied
to Vietnam, and this moral growth, so to speak, was implicit within
its initial historical dimensions.
Those who are working for a new world order system based upon
some form of effective central guidance in matters of war and peace
reject as obsolescent and regressive the "realism" of national interest
approaches to foreign policy. There is a new realism emerging out of
the need to adapt the state system to the multiple challenges of war,
population pressure, global pollution, resource depletion, and human
25. Quoted in CUMms OF WAR 222 (R. Falk, R. Lifton S. G. Kolko eds. 1971).
26. In this regard, even Schlesinger's affirmation of the Nuremberg tradition suggests
the reality of the precedent set after World War II.
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alienation.27 It is this new political consciousness that insists upon
regarding America's involvement in the Indochina War as illegal and
immoral from the beginning in the late 40s and early 50s. Such an
assessment can be made more authoritatively since the publication of
the Pentagon Papers.28 But the main point is that we are in a situation
of transition from one world order system to another, from a statist
logic which is no longer adequate to a normative logic associated with
the United Nations Charter and the Nuremberg Principles that does
not yet pertain. In the midst of such a process rigid distinctions between
what the law "is" and what it "ought to be" obscure the central reality
of movement from one position to another. Those who identify with a
progressive vision of world order are primarily agents of value change.
In this sense, to pass judgment on one's own government, to discredit
those who planned and waged aggressive warfare in Vietnam for so
many years, and to seek an application of the Nuremberg concept is to
embody the future in the present to some small extent. We become-in
a normative way-what we do.
II. Problems of Application: Wars without Victors
The facts available make it increasingly evident that the United
States has violated the Nuremberg Principles, and that its chief policy-
makers could be prosecuted before a Nuremberg-type court for crimes
in all three categories.2 9 In this section I address the question of what
action is appropriate given the unavailability of a proper adjudicating
tribunal. Since the evidence is now increasingly available to support
27. One interesting recent effort to demonstrate the dangers of world catastrophe
embodied in present patterns of human behavior and political organization is J. Forausrt,
WORLD DYNAmIcs (1971). See also the material prepared by the Club of Rome's Project
on the Predicament of Mankind under the direction of MIT Professor Dennis L. Meadows,
especially Phase One: Dynamics of Global Equilibrium, D-1550-1, April 1971 (mimeo-
graphed pamphlet).
On the level of intuition and consciousness, the need for drastic change has been under-
stood in a variety of distinct modes. Among those that I have found congenial and signifi-
cant are the following: E. KMI=, Tnn ToWER AND Tmm Amiss (1957); D. Lmicr, Tan
GOLDEN NomasooK (1962); D. LEsSING, BRIEFING FOR A DEScENT mro HELL (1970); C. REc,
THE GREENING OF ARmmcA (1970); several songs by the Beatles, vintage 1958.69 (eg., "Black-
bird." "Revolution I," "Revolution 9') and by Bob Dylan (especially "Bloin' in the
Wind"). The point here is that there are many converging perceptions of the objective
situation that complement one another in a period during which traditional beliefs and
structures are dangerously outmoded. Legal and political anal)sis needs to be made more
receptive to these more literary sources of understanding, if for no other reason than the
basic imperative of sanity-to obtain a better fix on reality.
28. See, for example, the report on United States counter-insurgency operation in
Vietnam, including North Vietnam, in the 1954-55 period, prepared by Col. Edward G.
Lansdale, head of the so-called "Saigon Military Mission," reprinted in Tam Pr-aco.n
PAPERs, supra note 7, at 53-66.
29. See note 13 supra for a specification of the three categories of cr-ines.
1511
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 80: 1501, 1971
allegations of criminality, the non-availability of an adjudicating forum
is at present the most crucial policy issue.
The Nuremberg concept presupposed an Allied victory in World
War II. In the context of the Vietnam War there is no prospect that
the United States will be defeated in the sense of surrendering to North
Vietnam or the National Liberation Front.30 The other side would not,
as a consequence, be in a position to convene a tribunal that would
hear charges against United States military and civilian leaders.31 More-
over, the organized international community has neither the will nor
the capability to proceed against the most powerful country in the
world. There is no prospect, in other words, of bringing United States
leaders before the bar of international justice, even as it was so im-
perfectly enacted at Nuremberg.
There is some sentiment among legalistic observers who argue that
the inability to convene an international war crimes tribunal should
put to rest, once and for all, allegations about war crimes. Taylor is
somewhat ambiguous about his own position. On the one hand, he
says that at the end of the war crimes trials after World War II
[t]he United States Government stood legally, politically and
morally committed to the principles enunciated in the charters
and judgments of the tribunals. The President of the United
States, on the recommendation of the Departments of State, War
30. The notion of "victory" in this kind of conflict is elusive. There is some validity
to the well-known observations of Henry Kissinger on this point that were written before
he entered the Government as Mr. Nixon's principal foreign policy adviser: "We fought I
military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition: our
opponents armed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one
of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The con-
ventional army loses if it does not win." Kissinger, The 'iet Nan Negotiations, 47
FOREIGN AFFAiRS 211, 214 (1969). But "victory" in this sense still does not carry with it
any prospect of access to potential enemy defendants in a war crimes trial.
31. Of course, it is possible to convene a tribunal or commission of inquiry without
access to American defendants. The Russell Tribunal was the most prominent effort that
has been made to carry on such an inquiry. Its findings were disregarded for a variety of
reasons having nothing to do with whether or not the central conclusions were well-
founded. For proceedings of the Russell Tribunal, see DUFFErr, supra note 2. It Is
virtually impossible to expect those ruling groups that are the main target of such ae.
cusations to allow this kind of procedure to attain much credibility in the public mind.
Part of the issue here is the extent of government monopoly over the definition of "legiti-
mate action." Radical anti-war efforts have, whether articulately or not, always presup.
posed some role for individual and popular judgment in assessing the nature of
"legitimacy," and have increasingly perceived the gap between personal morality and
governmental action as being indicative of a loss of legitimacy by the state rather than
as an upsurge of lawless impulses and attitudes on their part.
Another possibility is that a Nuremberg-type tribunal might be constituted in Vietnam,
Laos, Cambodia, or for all of Indochina to inquire into the commission of war crimes
and that some actual defendants (mainly Indochinese) would be prosecuted. Such an
eventuality depends on the way the various facets of the Indochina War come to an end,
and, most particularly, on whether the leaders of the losing side negotiate, abdicate, or
surrender power.
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and Justice, approved of the war crimes programs .... The United
States delegation to the United Nations presented the resolution
by which the General Assembly endorsed the Nuremberg prin-
ciples. Thus the integrity of the nation is staked on those principles
[of Nuremberg] .... 32
In short, we created a precedent intended to bind ourselves in the
future. On the other hand, Taylor does not deal at all directly with
these difficult issues of application in the altered setting of the Ameri-
can involvement in Vietnam. Indeed, Taylor comes down hard against
entrusting domestic courts in the United States with any role in assess-
ing the legal status of the American involvement or the battlefield
tactics relied upon. Thus, despite a reasonably clear set of judgments
in the book that a Nuremberg problem has been created by our role in
Vietnam, there is absolutely no guidance given as to what can (or
should) be done about it. Taylor has said in response to this criticism
of his book that he regards the question of application as "a political
one"33 outside the scope of his technical competence. I suppose it is
"political" in the sense of involving the current mood of public
opinion. Obviously, if ninety per cent of the American public (rather
than a tiny number-say one per cent) was clamoring for war crimes
trials against Westmoreland, Abrams, Rusk, Rostow, and others, then
there would be a powerful movement in this country to constitute
some sort of tribunal.
There are also, however, serious legal questions presented. The
growth of international law has always depended on the vigor of its
domestic enforcement. The absence of an international tribunal is not
indispensable to serious judicial treatment of war crimes issues. After
all, the Eichmann case was heard before a domestic court in Israel, and
there is a Security Council Resolution calling upon nations to use
their domestic legal system to punish World War II war criminals.
34
In a variety of areas, ranging from the apprehension of international
pirates (and more recently hijackers) to the enforcement of antitrust
32. P. 94. See also Farer, supra note 9, at 12: "For our immediate purposes the central
point of this excursion in legal theory is that the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter were
acting consciously and conscientiously to establish a manifestly legal process, the outcome
of which would be a set of persuasive precedents."
33. This position was formulated very clearly by Taylor at the s)mposium on war
crimes. See note 4 supra.
34. The Security Council made a distinction in the Eichmann context between the
abduction of Eichmann by illegal means in Argentina and the duty of all governments
to pursue and prosecute alleged war criminals of the Nazi period. U.N. Doe. S/4349
(1960). The Argentine government had a duty to apprehend and prosecute Eichmann
or at least cooperate in turning him over to a government that would prosecute.
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and expropriation norms, domestic courts have performed valuable
functions when international tribunals were non-existent or unable to
act.35 Furthermore, a particularly strong case for the development of
a more active judicial role"6 could be made in light of certain tenden-
cies to downgrade Congress' constitutional role. The expansion of
executive prerogatives has eroded the constitutional scheme envisioned
by the framers and led to other undesirable effects as well. 31 In partic-
ular, the presidential power to maintain secrecy and to manage the
release of news has virtually nullified the development of legal re-
straints on war-making at the global level.38
Taylor advances a number of grounds for concluding that a domestic
court should not undertake inquiry into the legality of the American
involvement in the Vietnam War, either on constitutional grounds
of executive usurpation of congressional privilege, or on interna-
tional law grounds of incompatibility with treaty obligations to refrain
from non-defensive (or aggressive) uses of force.39
(1) To resolve the issue would require "the examination of hotly
controverted evidentiary questions" for which much relevant material
35. My own views on these issues are set forth in R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DoMEsTt
COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964), especially at 1-20. See also Lillich, The
Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9
(1970).
86. The most comprehensive discussion of the role of domestic courts in relation to
this subject matter is to be found in L. VELvEL, UNDECLARED WAR AND CIVIL DlsoDrDIENCE:
THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IN CmsIS (1970), especially at 113-80. See also Wormuth, The
Vietnam War: The President versus the Constitution, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAiv 711-807 (R. Falk ed. 1969).
37. There is a growing literature on these facets of the American involvement In the
Vietnam War. Among the more useful are A. AUSTIN, THE PRESIDENT'S WAR: Tilt STORY Or
THE TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION AND How THE NATION WAS TRAPPED IN VIETNAM (1971);
J. GouLDEN, TRUTH IS THE FIRST CASUALTY: THE GULF or TONKIN AFFAIR-ILLUSION AND
REALITY (1969); E. WINDCHY, TONKIN GULF (1971). See generally H. GALLAGHER, ADVISE
AND OsTRucr: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS (1969);
M. PUSEY, THE WAY WE Go TO WAR (1969); Hearings on U.S. Commitments to Foreign
Powers Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
On a more general level see T. DRAPER, AnusE OF PowER (1967); D. KRASLOW 8 S. LooRY,
THE SECRET SEARCH FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM (1968); F. SCHURMANN, P. SCrT, & R. ZELINXi,
THE PoLrICs OF ESCALATION IN VIETNAM (1966).
These issues of constitutional imbalance underlie inquiry into the decision to disclose the
Pentagon Papers so that the public and Congress might know more about past deception
and about the manipulation of news by the Executive Branch through well-timed "leaks,"
"backgrounders," and the like.
38. On the development of international law in this area see Q. WRiGTr, ThE RoLE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw IN THE ELIMINATION OF WAR (1961). For a more skeptical interpreta-
tion of these developments, see J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITinu Or
UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION (1958).
89. It is important to emphasize the distinction here between the "illegality" of a war
and its "criminality." Domestic courts have been asked by litigants to rule only on the
issue of illegality as it impinges on their rights as citizens. Such rulings are quite different
from a determination that particular government leaders are "guilty" of war crimes and,
by Nuremberg reasoning, should be held individually responsible.
1514
Vol. 80: 1501, 1971
Nuremberg: Past, Present, and Future
is unavailable; these questions involve the quantum and timing of
infiltration from North to South Vietnam, the status of the 1954
Geneva Accords, the relevance of the SEATO Treaty; 0
(2) Unlike the situation after the Second World War, the per-
ception of who is "the aggressor" in the setting of Vietnam is very diffi-
cult to adjudicate because even the issue of "who attacked whom" is
factually and legally murky; Taylor also stresses here the inability of
governments through the years to evolve an agreed definition of aggres-
sion;U
(3) In Nuremberg and Tokyo it was possible for the prosecution
to establish intent and motivation by relying on the "proven intentions
and declarations" of the defendants;4 2
(4) Congress has endorsed the war by means of the Tonkin Resolu-
tion in 1964 and by voting appropriations since that time;4
3
(5) The judicial capacity to act in the area of foreign affairs is
severely restricted, even if it is not entirely clear whether this is a
matter of constitutional requirement or judicial self-restraint.
44
On these bases Taylor concludes that "the Supreme Court is not
authorized to render judgment on the validity of our participation in
the Vietnam War under the Nuremberg Principles or international
law in general."4 5 It is Taylor's view that "[a]fter five years of bloody
and costly war sustained by Congressional appropriations, if the Presi-
dent's course is to be checked by another branch of the Government,
it is the Congress and not the Court that can and should be the checking
agent. " 4 This line of argument is very statist in character, for it over-
looks the degree to which the denial of standing and judicial relief to
individual citizens raising these legal issues undermines the legitimacy








47. For extended analysis in a legal context, see L. VELnvm, supra note 36, at 183-250. For
a broader rationale of recourse to tactics of "illegal" resistance in response to failures by
the government to abide by minimum standards of law and morality, see D. BMnGtu*-,
THE TR oF THE CTONsiuLE NInE (1970); B. DE.mIN, REVOLUTION & Equiuenrin]
(1971); J. MrFoRo, Ti-E TPJAL OF DR. SPocr, (1969); WE WoN'r Go: Pr~soVMA Accouxrs oF
WNAR RIsinmxs (S. Lynd ed. 1968). A celebrated discussion of the jurisprudential founda-
tions of these issues in a pre-Vietnam setting is found in the debate between H.L.A. Hart
and Lon Fuller. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAMv. L. REV.
593 (1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HAnM.
L- Rzv. 630 (1958).
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relief in relation to the war have grown out of refusals to enter the
armed forces or pay taxes---out of refusals, in other words, to contribute
to the war. I have argued elsewhere that in this situation "the wider
logic of Nuremberg" supports such assertions, whereas Taylor writes
that "Nuremberg acquittals of generals and industrialists cut directly
against Professor Falk's argument."48 Not at all. My argument is not
based on Nuremberg as a precedent in a strict sense of what was
decided there, but rather by conceiving of Nuremberg as a set of direc-
tives about individual responsibility in relation to aggressive war-
making. In this regard "the wider logic" includes such actions in the
Nuremberg setting as President Roosevelt's appeal of 1944 to the
German citizenry on the issue of war crimes:
Hitler is committing these crimes against humanity in the name
of the German people. I ask every German and every man every-
where under Nazi domination to show the world by his action that
in his heart he does not share these insane criminal desires. Let
him hide these pursued victims, help them to get over their
borders, and do what he can to save them from the Nazi hangman.
I ask him to keep watch, and to record the evidence that will one
day be used to convict the guilty.49
There is an implicit civic responsibility to resist and oppose any war
that it seems reasonable to believe is aggressive, and, hence, whose
furtherance involves the commission of crimes against peace.
Part of the "wider logic" also involves the generalized responsibility
of all actors at every level of social organization to implement the basic
Nuremberg directives. The United Nations Security Council has urged
governments to facilitate the prosecution of World War II war
criminals. By preparing the Nuremberg Principles-merely a codifica-
tion of what was decided at Nuremberg-the United Nations has set
forth general standards of responsibility that pertain to all who hold
high public office. 0
And, finally, the wider logic has to do with giving effect to the
Nuremberg concept in other contexts than the prosecution of those
leaders responsible for the policy. The effort of war resisters to turn
48. P. 119, and see Falk, Six Legal Dimensions of the United States Invol'ement in the
Vietnam War, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 216, 250 (R. Falk ed. 1969.
49. Text reprinted in CRLMES OF WAR 77-78 (R. Falk, R. Lifton & G. Kolko eds. 1971).
50. The Nuremberg Principles, as such, are not in binding form, but they appear to
restate accurately the assumptions and conclusions of the Nuremberg Judgment. In this
regard, these Principles provide evidence of the content of customary international law
on this subject. For a general consideration of these issues,'see C. PARRY, THE SouRCES AN
EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1965).
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the legal system against illegal and criminal warfare involves a symbolic
effort to use these ideas of personal responsibility to inhibit unrestricted
sovereign discretion in the area of war and peace. America is not Nazi
Germany, and, precisely for this reason, the vulnerability of the war-
making apparatus may be in the responsiveness of its institutions to
the values embedded in Nuremberg thinking rather than in the vulner-
ability of the power apparatus to decisive battlefield defeat., "The
wider logic" explores the possibilities of enforcing Nuremberg in a
situation where "victor's justice" is unavailable, and where the war
machine and its underlying criminality persist.52
In responding to Taylor I would like to deal in sequence with each
of his five points.
(1) Evidence of criminal behavior. Since the publication of the
Pentagon Papers there is ample documentary material on which to
assess the central issue of whether the United States Government has
been waging a war of aggression in Indochina."3 Some difficult issues
of interpretation remain, but these issues are not inherently more diffi-
cult than those confronting courts in many other areas of the law, nor
do they seem to hamper greatly the prospect of reaching a clear con-
clusion. On the issue of war crimes and crimes against humanity there
is less documentary evidence, but there is also less need for it as alter-
native sources of reliable evidence exist. For instance, there are now
51. See discussion of this kind of consideration in Epilogue to the German Edition of
The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle, reprinted in J. GRAY, On U.,DmsTANDING
VIOLENCE PHILOSOPHICALLY AND OTHER EssAYs 3543 (1970). "Again and again it has seemed
to me that our nation has had unparalleled opportunities in this conflict to declare to
the world: we made a mistake, we are wrong, we are going to end this slaughter right now,
so far as our troops are concerned. The effect of a strong nation able to make such a
drastic break with its past might well have been an electrifying one. To some of us 'who
consider ourselves loyal citizens of the United States, it would have been an occasion of
sober joy." Id. at 38.
52. The "Nixon Doctrine," the prevailing statement of official policy in light of the
Vietnam experience, maintains the same pattern of commitments to foreign governments
confronted by insurgent challenges mounted within, or largely within, their own territory.
American involvement will include military equipment and heavy air support, but will
seek to avoid introducing American troops. For authoritative statement of the Nixon Doc-
trine, see President Nixon's report to the Congress of Feb. 25, 1971, United States Foreign
Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace, 7 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDNTIAL Docu-
, fENTs 305, 308 (March 1, 1971). The Nixon Doctrine has been applied to the struggle for
control of Cambodia, resulting in heavy destruction and much suffering on the part of
the civilian population. For a description, see CAmODIA: TtE WIDENING WAR IN INTO-
CnNA (J. Grant, L. Moss & J. Unger eds. 1971).
53. But even before the publication of the "Pentagon Papers," it was reasonable to
conclude that the United States wras guilty of waging aggressive war in Vietnam. Perhaps
the most comprehensive analysis along these lines has been prepared under the auspices
of the Consultative Council of the Lawyers Committee on American Policy Tomads
Vietnam. See ViErtNAM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LEcALrrY OF TiE U.S.
MILITARY INvOLvEmENT (2d rev. ed. J. Fried rapporteur 199).
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available numerous Vietnam veterans who are willing and eager to
testify about the tactics, methods, and weapons of warfare used, and
who, in many instances, themselves participated in specific massacres.
There is no longer, if indeed there ever was, any reasonable doubt
about the main patterns of warfare relied upon by the United States
in Vietnam that have been challenged as illegal.5 The evidence is
there.
(2) Identity of the aggressor. It is correct, as Taylor suggests, that
the setting of the Vietnam War is different from that of World War
II, but I do not find it significantly different. The extension of the
combat zone to North Vietnam in 1965 and the character of the inter-
ventions by both sides in South Vietnam seem susceptible to legal
analysis and inference. Indeed, pro-Administration and anti-Admini-
stration legal scholars have long shared the conviction that the law
and the facts are clear enough to support an inference of aggression-
though they do not agree on who the aggressor is.5 Why under such
circumstances is it impossible for a court to make a comparable assess-
ment? Indeed, the Government as a whole seems estopped from even
contending that it is impossible to identify the aggressor in the Viet-
nam context since it has itself so frequently argued that it was acting
in defense against aggression.
The failure of governments to reach an agreement on the inter-
national definition of aggression is surely not a plausible obstacle to
a domestic court reaching a determination in relation to specifically
challenged conduct. This assertion takes on more weight when it is
realized that the growth of American law has proceeded on the assump-
tion that the content of general concepts has generally depended on
a case-by-case development rather than by applying some sort of defini-
tion agreed to in advance. Indeed, the United States has been a leading
opponent of international attempts to define aggression, and has
consistently opposed the definitional initiatives of the Soviet Union
and others on these general grounds of legal policy. Finally, there was
enough clarity about the character of aggression at Nuremberg and
Tokyo to permit authoritative inferences of aggression in the absence
54. For comprehensive description, see E. HERMAN, AmocnrEs IN VIETNAM: lNfytM g AND
REALrIES 20-88 (1970); CoMM. oF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHoLARs, TaE INDOCIIINA STORY
79-144 (1970).
55. See, e.g., selections on both sides in I THE VE'NAzu "WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
318-508 (R. Falk ed. 1968). But see White, Misperception of Aggression in Vietnam, id. at
523-40. For a skeptical view of legal interpretation, see Mayda, The Vietnam Conflict and
International Law in 2 TnE V1mmNAu WAR AND INTRNATioNAL LAW 260-70 (R. Falk ed.
1969), especially at 268-69.
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of a definition. It is not at all clear that striking first is a decisive
indicator of the identity of the aggressor (consider, for example, the
legal debate about the outbreak of the 1967 Middle Eastern War, or
the American threat to use force, if necessary, to prevent the deploy-
ment of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962) or that there was an undis-
puted chain of aggressive actions by Germany and Japan and of
defensive responses by the Allied Powers.50 Taylor's argument that
the identity of the aggressors in World War II was clear by comparison
with Vietnam is merely self-serving in relation to his conclusion.
(3) Evidence of intentions. Taylor's argument here, too, has been
undercut by the publication of the Pentagon Papers. Even if these
documents are incomplete or onesided, as claimed by most of the
principal officials depicted therein, a prima facie case has still been
made and a burden to come forward imposed on those who would
repudiate the available evidence of intentions. Furthermore, the issue
before domestic courts would not be the criminality of specific govern-
ment officials, as to which intent is relevant, but the legality of state
action, as to which it is not relevant. If the concerns under (1) and (2)
are dissipated, then (3) seems immaterial in many contexts where judi-
cial redress has been sought. This issue of intent seems relevant only
to the formation of some Nuremberg-type operation against specifi-
cally identified defendants.
(4) Congressional endorsement. By now, there is ample indication
that the passage of the Tonkin Resolution should not be viewed as an
endorsement of the legality of the war as a whole any more than its
later repeal should be viewed as a repudiation of the war.57 Several
prominent Senators who voted for the Tonkin Resolution have been
outspoken opponents of the war for several years and have denied their
intention to give the President blanket authority to expand the combat
theater. The argument on appropriations seems even weaker since it
has been made abundantly clear by many Congressmen and Senators
that votes for appropriations have reflected an overriding concern for
the physical welfare of Americans in the battlefield. However miscon-
ceived and implausible such a rationale may be (i.e., the welfare of
American soldiers could be best safeguarded by earmarking appropri-
ations "for withdrawal purposes only"), nevertheless it suffices to estab-
56. On the causal complexity of how major wars start, see A.J.P. TAYLon, Tul OlIGINs
OF TnE SECOND Wopu) WAR (1961). See also the sources cited note 12 supra.
57. For a full consideration of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, see sources cited note 32
supra. See also Resolution repealing Tonkln Gulf Resolution, H.J. Res. 1302. 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970).
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lish the view that a vote for appropriations cannot properly be con-
strued as a vote for the war. 8 In any event, congressional approval
of the war is not strictly relevant to its legal status. Congress might
(and often has) given its formal approval to executive policy that courts
deem unconstitutional. The doctrines of judicial review and of consti-
tutional supremacy as developed in American legal history presuppose
that courts have the last word on issues of this kind. Obviously, the
need for a court to reach a decision that challenges fundamental policy
of both coordinate branches poses political problems of great delicacy
for a society that prides itself on popular sovereignty and representative
government, but these difficulties are not properly viewed as obstacles
to adjudication. Especially where individual issues of life and death
and collective issues of war and peace are concerned, the right of judi-
cial redress seems to take clear precedence over the prospect of poten-
tially harmful clashes among coordinate branches of government.
(5) Judicial incapacity in the area of foreign affairs. Taylor's argu-
ment that courts are severely restricted in the area of foreign affairs
also seems unconvincing. There have been very few tests of the scope
of judicial power in the area of foreign affairs, and these have been
in relation to special circumstances favoring judicial prerogatives.
The "political question doctrine" as a basis for deference seems to be
the most persuasive ground on which to urge courts to side-step the
legal issues raised by the Vietnam War, but even this argument is not
very strong. As Baker v. Car5 9 made clear there is no fixed context
for a "political question." In the present context, there seems to be a
powerful basis in law and policy to reverse past dispositions of courts
to treat all issues of foreign policy as falling within the domain of exec-
utive discretion and outside the domain of judicial scrutiny. Until the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, no effort was ever made to outlaw aggres-
sive war, but since that time numerous events have confirmed the
growth of this prohibitive rule of law. As I have argued under (1),
(2), and (3), there are no technical difficulties in the Vietnam context
to prevent applying this rule in a substantive setting. In more general
terms, the importance of this rule of international law, which is central
to the United Nations Charter, makes it desirable for domestic courts
to enforce it. The incapacity of the political organs of the United
Nations to proceed effectively against a principal state, and the general
58. See Wooters, The Appropriations Power as a Tool of Congressional Foreign Policy
Making, 50 B.U. L. REv. 54 (Special Issue, Spring 1970).
59. 369 U.S. 186, 211-13 (1962).
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unavailability of an adjudicating tribunal on the global level, make it
especially important to establish the responsibility of domestic courts
in this area. It has been generally true that domestic courts have been
far more important than international courts in developing and up-
holding international law. The particular situation, in which the
United States is the most powerful actor on the world scene and is
deeply involved in foreign military operations, makes it evident that if
legal limits are going to be made relevant at all, these limits must be
generated on a domestic level. Since the executive part of the govern-
ment is already engaged in evolving the policy, normally with the
acquiescence of Congress, the courts are the only conceivable arena in
which a serious legal challenge can be mounted. Admittedly, such a
position requires "a new patriotism" in which the national interest in
law-abidingness in international undertakings is given an unprece-
dented priority.60
I close this section with some general observations that go beyond
the response to Taylor's specific arguments. Professor Taylor under-
estimated the strength of the Nuremberg imperative within our polit-
ical culture when he wrote that "it is difficult to envisage other circum-
stances [than "total military victories"] that would unlock the secret
files." 61 Without "the wider logic," Daniel Ellsberg would probably not
have been motivated to act as he did. It is significant to note that
Ellsberg spoke of himself as a war criminal warranting prosecution
before he apparently decided that he had a duty to unlock "the secret
files.
The issues of separation of powers and "political question" seem
an insufficient basis for judicial passivity. Legal criteria now exist by
which to appraise a challenge directed at war policies.t3 The flow of
power from Congress to the Executive in the war/peace area has badly
distorted the constitutional notion of checks and balances. Where Con-
60. In this new patriotism the values embodied in the Charter of the United Nations
would gradually displace Westphalia values so far as dominant modes of political con-
sciousness are concerned.
61. Pp. 118-19.
62. Remarks, Conference, Princeton Univ., Apr. 19, 1971. See also Ellsberg's contribu-
tions in KNOLL & MCFADDEN, supra note 6, at 82-84, 158. "I speak not as a researcher but
from the experience as a former official of the Defense Department and the State Depart-
ment in Washington and Vietnam--experience that makes me a possible defendant in a
future war crimes trial. Some ten years ago I read the transcript o the Nuremberg Trials.
and that left me with the sense of what an exhibit in a war crimes trial looks like. As I
was working in the Department of Defense, I did in some cases have a feeling while read-
ing documents late at night that I was looking at future exhibits." Id. at 158.
63. For well-developed reasoning along these lines, see the decisions and briefs in
Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 429 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1970)
(denial of preliminary injunction); Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
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gress fails to act and a clear issue of urgent national welfare is at stake,
courts have an obligation to act.
Obviously, it is tempting for an American court to dispose of such
issues as belonging to the province of the Executive or as having been
resolved by subsequent congressional action that governs judicial ac-
tion, but to yield to such temptation is to consign our institutions to
a state of impotence during times of emergency. The differences
between Nazi Germany and ourselves need to be stressed in con-
sidering the benefits and burdens that would result from allowing this
conflict within our public consciousness to be dealt with by domestic
courts. To shut off judicial redress leaves conflict to the streets; to con-
trol the streets is to initiate a program of "pacification" at home that
seriously endangers the fragile institutions of our kind of democratic
polity. 4
III. Nuremberg and the Present
In writing recently about the waning impact of the Pentagon Papers,
Walter Pincus suggested that "[a] year from now, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg
may look back and wonder why he did it.""6 As with the invasion of
Cambodia in May 1970, the My Lai disclosures, and the Galley trial, the
revelations of the Pentagon Papers have generated some temporary furor
in the country, but have not exerted any decisive influence on either
public opinion or government policies. 6 In each instance, the war per-
sists, bureaucratic momentum is maintained, public apathy is restored,
and the bipartisan elite that conceived and executed the Vietnam inter-
vention remains in or close to power. There has been neither a turn
against the war, nor against the war-makers, nor even against the mil-
itary-industrial complex. To be sure, there are ripples of discontent,
but the dominant mood of the country appears to stress the continuity
between the recent past and the hoped-for future. 7
64. A cycle of rebellion and repression can be initiated whenever deeply-felt and
widely-shared abuses cannot be redressed by recourse to normal grievance machinery,
On the tendency of a cycle of rebellion and repression in foreign settings to be Imported,
see Ahmad, Winning Hearts and Minds: The Theory and Fallacies of ounterinstirgency,
THE NATION, August 2, 1971, at 70-85, especially at 84-85.
65. Pincus, After the Pentagon Papers: The Same Old Story, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Aug. 16,
1971, at 46.
66. The news media emphasized the conflict between the government and the press
with respect to the publication of the Pentagon Papers and failed to treat the substance
of the disclosure with any depth of analysis or concern.
67. There is no serious disposition evident within the country to repudiate the counter-
revolutionary foreign policy adopted by the United States in relation to the countries of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America; it is this commitment to help foreign governments repregs
their own populations that underlay the involvement in Vietnam from the outset.
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If we consider this evidence of continuity from the perspective of
the Nuremberg tradition, the implications are extremely discour-
aging. Interpreting Nuremberg for the benefit of German society in
1947, Karl Jaspers wrote that "[t]he essential point is whether the Nu-
remberg trial comes to be a link in a chain of meaningful, constructive
political acts (however often these may be frustrated by error, unreason,
heartlessness and hate) or whether, by the yardstick there applied to
mankind, the very powers now erecting it will in the end be found
wanting."68 As of 1971, the United States has clearly not carried for-
ward the Nuremberg tradition either with respect to the use of its
military power against a foreign society or with regard to attitudes
toward individual responsibility. Despite the evidence of war crimes,
crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity, one detects neither
public indignation of any magnitude nor any effort to hold the main
policy-makers accountable to any degree for the moral consequences
to Vietnam and to America of the involvement.09 What public indigna-
tion there is has to do with costs and failure, that the war plans were too
expensive given the interests at stake and that these plans did not ac-
complish the mission of securing South Vietnam for an anti-commu-
nist Saigon regime.7° To discredit policy-makers for their failure to
achieve stated goals is a normal accompaniment of any democratic
system of political accountability. But it represents only a pragmatic,
and not a normative basis of judgment 7 1 for such criticism happens also
when the means and goals of policy were admirable.
68. K. JAsPers, supra note 1, at 59. Jaspers goes on in the same passage as follo.s:
The powers initiating Nuremberg thereby attest their common aim of world govern-
ment, by submitting to world order. They attest their willingness really to accept
responsibility for mankind as the result of their victory-not just for their own
countries. Such testimony must not be false testimony.
It will either create confidence in the world that right was done and a foundation
laid in Nuremberg-in which case the political trial will have become a legal one,
with law creatively founded and realized for a new world now waiting to be built.
Or disappointement by untruthfulness will create an even worse world atmosphere
breeding new wars; instead of a blessing, Nuremberg would become a factor of doom,
and in the world's eventual judgment the trial would have been a sham and a mock
trial. This must not happen.
On the counter-revolutionary drift of American foreign policy since World Wrar f,
see R. BARcrr, INTERvENTION AND REVOLUTION: TuE UNrrED STATES AND TiE TiuRD Wonx.ri
(1968); G. MACEOIN, REVOLUTION NEXT DOOR: Li,=N Asuspua, IN TitE 1970's (1971); R.
STEELE, PAx AM RCAN'A (1967).
69. Accountability could also be achieved by paying reparations to the peoples of
Indochina or by exonerating those who engaged in non-violent acts of war resstance.
An atmosphere of reconciliation might be established by offering amnesty to war criminals,
both as an acknowledgement of political reality and as a way of dealing with these
questions in some non-punitive level of concern.
70. For an analysis of these principal options, see Falk, What We Should Learn From
Vietnam, FOREIGN PotIcy, Winter 1970-71, at 98-114.
71. And pragmatic tests of qualification also may be applied in situations uwhere the
normative objectives of statesmen were admirable.
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This American repudiation of the Nuremberg tradition is part of a
more general pattern of international behavior. The Soviet interven-
tions in Eastern Europe, the French colonial wars in Indochina and
Algeria, and the Anglo-French cooperation in the Suez campaign are
examples of international conduct that appear to be criminal if mea-
sured by Nuremberg standards. These examples of criminality are
taken only to show that none of the powers that sat in judgment at
Nuremberg has kept the implicit promise of establishing a precedent
for the future. Indeed it is a tribute to the public consciousness of
America that the Nuremberg issue has been raised at all, although
this consciousness also reflects the length, the frustrations, and the
overall failure of the American effort in Vietnam. The basic inter-
national reality, tragic from the perspective of Nuremberg, is that
world public opinion, at least as it has crystallized in the setting of
the United Nations, neither expects nor insists upon carrying forward
the Nuremberg tradition. This is partly because the pattern of repudi-
ation seems so pervasive, and partly because there is no international
capability to pass judgment upon the actions of a state that has not
been utterly defeated in a war.
12
The failure of Nuremberg is a matter both of behavior and of
public consciousness. On both levels the Nuremberg tradition has
been virtually repudiated by the governments that dominate inter-
national life. The only open question is whether some popular move-
ment could revive and sustain this tradition in defiance of the statist
logic that prevails in international life. And it is for this reason that
unorganized efforts by "peace criminals," peace groups, and journalists
seem so important. They are important because the future of world
society ultimately depends on keeping the promises of Nuremberg.
For, again quoting Jaspers, "Ever since European nations have tried
and beheaded their monarchs, the task of the people has been to keep
their leaders in check. The acts of states are also the acts of persons.
Men are individually responsible and liable for them."' 3 Jaspers' book
is especially relevant to the present discussion because he is so keenly
aware of the small degree to which Nuremberg as an external judgment
72. Relation of international forces since World War II has not favored decisive endingg
of wars in which principal states have been significantly involved on either side. There
have been withdrawals by major governments from positions of colonial occupation, but
not wars in which the losing side surrenders and is occupied by the victorious side,
Castro's regime in Cuba held trials of alleged "criminals" in the Batista regime after It
gained power in January 1959. For a general study, with theoretical importance, ace
F. IKLA, EvErY WAR Must END (1971).
73. JAspr., supra note 1. at 55.
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really disposed of the genuine issues for German society of coping with
the Nazi experience. These issues have their proper locus within the
national consciousness of the state that has acted in such criminal
fashion. The external judgment by its externality tends to divert atten-
tion from the need to emphasize internal processes of renewal7
IV. Keeping the Nuremberg Idea Alive
My purpose here is to set forth very briefly some lines of construc-
tive initiative. This discussion is based upon the assumption that it
may well be impractical and undesirable to press for formal trials
of those American political and military leaders principally responsible
for the overall drift of the Vietnam involvement and for the main
battlefield tactics. The formation of an American commission of
inquiry into the issue of war crimes that would assemble evidence
and draw conclusions on these questions could have a constructive
impact.75 It also seems essential for the moral status of law in Ameri-
can society that steps be taken to exonerate draft resisters, tax evaders,
and others who committed non-violent "crimes" to manifest their
opposition to the Vietnam War. There seems to be ample basis for
the United States to pay reparations to Vietnam (and to Laos and
Cambodia) to help overcome the war damage that has been done;
these reparations should be gathered on as public a basis as possible,
perhaps being collected from a one per cent income tax surcharge for a
number of years and from cuts in the counter-insurgency portion of
the Defense Department budget. In any event, the idea that American
has some ongoing responsibility toward those war-ravaged societies
seems essential for our civil health. This assertion of an American
responsibility does not imply direct participation in post-war Indo-
china. Funds should be channeled through an international trust
arrangement and given to the Indochina governments to spend ac-
cording to their own priorities.
There are some other steps that can be taken even given the low
state of public consciousness in these matters. Governments could
press for a new world conference, on the order of the Hague Confer-
ence in 1899, to establish new laws of war incorporating, to the extent
74. For major repudiation of such external judgment, see E. vou SAIomo.w, TnE AN-
swERs (1954). But see C. FrrzcmBoN, DF AlniAmcnoN (1969).
75. See Dusrrr, supra note 2. See also Proceedings of the Oslo Commission of Inquiry
into US. War Crimes in Indochina (1971) (mimeographed materials).
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possible, both the normative (for instance, the Nuremberg experience
and the United Nations Charter) and technological developments of
the last several decades70 At a minimum, the process of preparing for
such a conference would bring many of the issues into the field of
awareness in a vivid way.7" Participation by governmental delegations
would reaffirm the restraints of law and morality upon the discretion
of governmental officials, and the pressure to produce something
tangible might lead to a renewal of the law of war on a realistic and
effective basis. The international climate seems somewhat receptive to
an initiative of this type, given such bloody struggles as those in Indo-
china, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the Middle East.
Another area of change involves structuring our own governmental
system to make it more responsive to normative restraints in relation
to warfare.78 Congress could clarify its own relation to the Presidency
and establish definite procedures to authorize limited objectives within
fixed times and periods; in other words, except for an emergency
response to a sudden attack, recourse to war should be based on specific
congressional declaration, although it need not be technically treated
as a Declaration of War.79 If the President acted without such au-
thorization or beyond its express terms, then he could be made sub.
ject to a series of congressional remedies ranging from censure to
impeachment, and any Member of Congress should be given judicial
access to seek declaratory, and possibly injunctive, relief. Congress
could also grant the courts an express mandate to hear arguments about
76. It may not be realistic to suppose that governments would be willing to partldpate
in such an endeavor given the widespread practice of counter-insurgency warfare, It may
also be questioned whether the statist bias that would be likely to underle such a world
conference might not produce a code that was heavily weighted in favor of counter-
insurgent preferences. These are real concerns, but not of sufficient weight to avoid the
relapses into barbaric behavior that occur whenever a large-scale war of counter-insurgency
takes place and relies upon high-technology weaponry. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, ON CCNO,
ciDE (1968) and Ahmad, supra note 64.
77. The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment scheduled to take
place in Stockholm in June 1972 is an example of an effort to use an intergovernmental
conference setting to heighten awareness, as well as to fashion specific solutions to shared
problems.
78. I do not feel optimistic about the prospects for major institutional developments on
a global level, although important thinking is being done in support of such initiatives.
See T. HoLToN, AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CouRT: DESIGN FOR A MIOVE FROMs STATE CRIME
To WORLD LAW (1970); TowARD A FEAsiLE INTRrAzoNAL CRIMINAL CouRT (J. Stone &
R. Woetzel eds. 1970).
79. Requiring a Declaration of War might produce an excessively rigid procedure
under certain circumstances, especially where the President was seeking to moderate the
belligerent sentiments of Congress or the public. There is a danger in constitutional re-
form, as in military tactics, of designing a structure responsive to the last war rather than
to the next one. Also, a Declaration of War, although presenting a threshold of inhibition,
generates escalatory pressures in a powerful country to carry on with the war until victory
and to stifle domestic opposition to the war as "treasonous."
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the legal status of any war and confer standing upon individuals to
seek judicial redress for alleged infringement of personal and property
rights.
Of great potential importance would be the creation of some post
within the government which would have responsibility for conforming
the action of the country to the requirements of international law.
This post could be conceived of as an Attorney General for Inter-
national Affairs or as an Under-Secretary in a yet-to-be-created Depart-
ment of Peace. The function of this job would be to report privately
to the President on the legal status of any contemplated undertaking
by the United States and to report publicly any doubts about the legal
status of ongoing policies. Such a public official would serve notice on
the President that legal consequences of foreign policy activity would
receive explicit attention. Of course, there are many difficulties with
such a proposal:
-How does one prevent the government official entrusted with
the task of being an international law watchdog from becoming a
presidential lap dog?
-How does one take account of reasonable differences of opinion
as to the requirements of international law, requirements that are
often controversial in the extreme, especially in determining "ag-
gression," "armed attack," and "self-defense"?
-How can such a public official gain access to the facts upon which
a persuasive legal appraisal depends?
-How can an international law argument prevail in relation to
a determined President, a militant Congress, a mobilized elec-
torate?
-How would such legal judgment be enforced?
-How should account be taken of the failure of "the other side"
to show comparable respect for the restraints of international law?
These difficulties are generally characteristic of efforts to bring law
to bear on human behavior. Pitfalls, weaknesses and ambiguities are
unavoidable at all levels of social and political organization. Neverthe-
less, the legal approach seems a valid method of inhibiting aggressive
war-making and discouraging criminal methods of warfare. The na-
tional and human peril of allowing the discretion of governmental
centers of power and authority to determine the occasions and char-
acter of warfare seems clear enough. We need to build barriers against
war-making carried on in the name of national populations who are
often victimized by the process without ever participating in it. In
general, the next great movement of mankind needs to involve decisive
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action by the public "to keep their leaders in check" in the area of
war and peace.
The sorts of steps that I have outlined are intended only to indicate
a sense of direction on the most immediate level of response. In more
fundamental terms, I am persuaded by the view so eloquently and
persuasively held by J. Glenn Gray that "to resolve the problem of
warfare, civil or international," requires that "a transformation of a
deepgoing inner sort will have to come over men."80 I also share Gray's
view that "a changed attitude toward our habitat must precede-or at
least accompany-a changed attitude toward our fellow man."81
Law is largely a dependent variable in both accomplishing and
sustaining change, although it may symbolize emerging human aspira-
tions and precede a wider social adjustment to new challenges. The
Nuremberg idea needs to be understood as a statement both of aspira-
tion and of necessity. Our indebtedness to Telford Taylor, Daniel
Ellsberg, and the Berrigans is essentially the same: they remind us of our
ideals in a period of national and international danger. And Taylor has
further demonstrated that in earlier days of triumph we even acted
to translate these ideals into norms of judgment and conduct. The
question before all of us, at this time, is whether we who originally lit
the Nuremberg torch can keep it aflicker in these times of barbarism.
This question will not be answered affirmatively by governments, but
only by popular forces who are committed to building a new world
order in which tenderness toward nature and fellow man is the basis
of organization and action. It is this greater struggle that is being pre-
figured by the debate surrounding Nuremberg and Vietnam.
80. J. GRAY, supra note 51, at 37. See also J. GRAY, Tm WARMRs: RFLECTIONS ON M RN
iN BATrLE 215-42 (1959).
81. J. GRAY, supra note 51, at 41. This is also the basic argument on overcoming war
in R. FALK, THIs ENDANGERED PLANEr: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS TOR HUMAN SURVIVAL
(1971).
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